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The United States has continued to decrease its nuclear arsenal, which will affect 
the reliability of the extended deterrent it has provided to its allies. One of the allies, 
Japan, faces an ever-changing security environment. The question then becomes this: 
How would Japan react to a major reduction in the U.S. nuclear arsenal? Based on three 
cases studies, Japan will only choose a nuclear option if the U.S. has a major reduction, 
and North Korea and China continue their trajectory in regard to both their nuclear and 
conventional forces.  
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 MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION A.
How would Japan react to a major reduction in the U.S. nuclear arsenal?1 The 
United States has said that it will continue providing extended deterrence to its allies, but 
it has also said that it will move toward reduced nuclear weapons. What impact will this 
have on Japan’s propensity to acquire nuclear weapons? 
 IMPORTANCE B.
Nuclear weapons empower a nation to use an incredible force to protect itself 
from other nations. Economically, many of the northeast Asian countries have increased 
their global standing since the East Asian financial crisis. Japan, for instance, has the 
third largest economy in the world; however, it is still not considered one of the world’s 
superpowers.2 Although Japan has a large economy and the resources to develop nuclear 
weapons, it has chosen not to obtain nuclear weapons. If Japan were to pursue its own 
nuclear deterrence, Japan would have to make major changes to its own security policies. 
At the same time, the changes would affect many political issues such as the U.S.-Japan 
Security alliance, Japan’s standing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and Article 9 
of the Japanese Constitution. 
There are many barricades to Japan acquiring nuclear weapons; the most 
important include Article 9, the NPT, and domestic and international opinion. If a major 
reduction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal occurs, would Japan overcome these barriers and 
acquire nuclear weapons? There are two schools of thought on this subject. The norms 
school believes that current policies and the Japanese commitment to peace will prevent 
Japan from nuclearizing, even if the U.S. draws down. The norms school argues Japan 
will maintain the status quo and not try to obtain nuclear weapons because of its taboo 
                                                 
1 S. Paul Kapur, “The Effects on South Asia of Deep U.S. Nuclear Reductions,” The Nonproliferation 
Review 20, (2013): 279–288. For the purpose of this research, I use Kapur’s definition of “major 
reduction,” which is described as roughly 1,000 to 2,000 accountable strategic warheads. 
2 Data pulled from the International Monetary Fund Database World Economic Outlook Database 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/weorept.aspx. 
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against nuclear weapons. Conversely, the security-based school believes that Japan will 
acquire nuclear weapons despite policy obstacles if the U.S. follows through with a major 
reduction of its nuclear arsenal. The second argument comes from the thought that 
security concerns, such as China’s modernizing military and North Korea’s accelerating 
nuclear weapons program, will put pressure on the country to develop nuclear weapons. 
When translated, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution reads, 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
(2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right 
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.3 
One interpretation of Article 9 is that it bans Japan from maintaining any power 
projecting force. Although many experts consider nuclear weapons defensive weapons, 
the international community may perceive Japan’s arming itself with nuclear weapons as 
an aggressive and offensive action. The defensive capability of nuclear weapons lies in 
their ability to deter a threat from using conventional and non-conventional weapons for 
fear of retaliation by nuclear weapons. One could say that the discussion of Article 9 can 
fall under the norms or security side of the debate. If one were to believe that nuclear 
weapons were offensive in nature, then Article 9 prohibits Japan from obtaining nuclear 
weapons and Japan would need to amend Article 9. The change would have to allow the 
country to pursue a more offensive security policy. At the same time, if one believes that 
nuclear weapons are for defensive purposes, then one could argue that Article 9 allows 
Japan to seek a nuclear option for the changing security environment.  
Japan signed the NPT in 1970 and ratified it in 1976. The Non-Proliferation 
Treaty is an international treaty that focuses on three main objectives: “1) prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, 2) promote cooperation in the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and 3) further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament 
                                                 
3 James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History, (New York: W.W. Norton &Company, 2002), 540. 
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and general and complete disarmament.”4 The treaty determines which states are to be 
nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). One hundred 
ninety nations have signed and ratified this treaty, including NWS such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France. Under the treaty, NWSs cannot 
transfer nuclear weapons, and NNWSs cannot receive, manufacture, or acquire nuclear 
weapons. 
The NPT is important to the discussion because it includes policies that do not 
allow Japan to seek a nuclear option. Therefore, it falls under the norms school of 
thought. If one were to believe that Japan would obtain nuclear weapons for security 
purposes, the NPT would become a barrier that Japan would have to overcome. A person 
would have to argue that the changing security environment would be enough to cause 
Japan to either become an authorized NWS (recognized in the NPT), or completely 
withdraw from the NPT.  
The norms side of the debate would argue that Japan’s wartime atrocities in the 
first half of the 20th century could lead Japan’s neighbors to interpret any Japanese effort 
in establishing a power-projecting military or obtaining nuclear weapons as a highly 
provocative act. This has the potential to be met with aggression or have a destabilizing 
effect in the North East Asian region. A nuclear Japan would create instability within the 
North East Asian region. Japan would no longer be seen as the peaceful nation it has been 
since the end of World War II. Domestic factors may affect the country’s decision to 
nuclearize, but the security side of the debate would argue that potential threats from both 
North Korea and China could create an uncertain security environment and push the 
country toward proliferation of weapons. If the United States were to shrink its nuclear 
umbrella that covers Japan, Japan might then seek to obtain its own deterrent in the form 
of nuclear weapons. This thesis will determine what Japan is likely to do in the event of a 
major reduction of U.S. nuclear weapons by examining whether it has acted primarily on 
the basis of security concerns or normative concerns from WWII to the present. 
                                                 
4 “Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientist, accessed 
July 6, 2016, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm.   
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 LITERATURE REVIEW C.
Most of the current body of literature on Japan and nuclear weapons focuses on 
two major arguments. The first argument is that Japan will refrain from obtaining nuclear 
weapons because of the taboo against nuclear weapons in the country. Authors such as 
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mary Beth Nikitin, and Katsuhisa Furukawa support this side of 
the debate, because each views norm such as the NPT, Article 9, domestic and political 
opinion, and Japan’s reliance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella as essential to Japan. They 
believe that even with the changing security environment Japan will refrain from 
pursuing a nuclear option. 
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin argue in their Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) report that even though previous security related issues such as 
dispatching military equipment and personnel and development of missile defense 
systems have come into play, and the outcome showed a more aggressive Japan, the 
likelihood of Japan considering new possibilities for nuclear options is still slim.5  The 
same report showed they believe that the possibility is minimal because of domestic 
factors such as public and elite opinions, constitutional constraints, and external factors 
such as international law (e.g., the NPT). 
Katsuhisa Furukawa’s work Japan’s Policy and the Views on Nuclear Weapon: A 
Historical Perspective concludes that there is no likelihood of Japan going nuclear if the 
security environment remained the same.
6
 After North Korea’s nuclear test on October 9, 
2006, he wrote in “Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Test” 
that no leader in Japan would advocate pursuit of nuclear arms because the consensus is 
continued reliance on the U.S. extended deterrence.
7
 Finally, his article “Nuclear Arms 
Control and Disarmament: Views among Japan’s National Security Community” shows 
                                                 
5 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, Japan’s Nuclear Future:Policy Debate, Prospects, 
and U.S. Interest (CRS Report RL34487) (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, 2009). 
6 Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan’s Policy and Views on Nuclear Weapon: A Historical Perspective,” 
Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategic Studies 37 (2010). 
7 Katsuhisa Furukawa and Hajime Izumi, “Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North Korea’s 
Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Association, Accessed August 5, 2016, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/CoverStory. 
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the conflicting views of the Japanese community wish to maintain the pacifist ideal of 
nuclear zero, and their belief that a reduction in the U.S. nuclear arsenal could be 
destabilizing to the region.
8
 Even though Furukawa believes this could be destabilizing, 
he maintains that the Japanese should rely on the extended deterrence of the U.S.  
The other side of the debate argues that security will be a factor that could lead to 
Japan starting a nuclear weapons program. Authors such as Dong-Joon Jo, Erik Gartzke, 
and Stephen Meyer believe that security concerns are what cause countries to pursue a 
nuclear option.  
The authors Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke say that security concerns and 
technology are important in determining whether a nation will create a weapons program 
while politics, economics, and security are the factors that explain why a nation will 
possess nuclear weapons.
9
 One of the most recent perceived threats came from North 
Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in January of 2003 and its announcement that it 
possessed nuclear weapons in February of 2005. As a nuclear weapon state, North Korea 
not only poses a threat to the U.S. and South Korea, but it also poses a threat to stability 
in the region. Another country Japan has had to consider in relationship to its nuclear 
arms program is the growing hegemonic nation of China. Ten months before China’s first 
nuclear test in 1964, General Pierre Gallois of France was asked how would China’s 
nuclear weapons program affect Japan’s standing in the world.  General Gallois argued 
that Japan would have to choose between strengthening ties with the U.S., moving slowly 
out from the umbrella of the U.S. or developing its own nuclear weapons program.
10
 This 
statement would imply that as China continues its nuclear weapons program, the nation 
would potentially become a threat to Japan. 
                                                 
8 Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament: Views among Japan’s National 
Security Community,” Security Challenges 6, no. 4 (2010): 33–54. 
9 Dong-Jong Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 51, no.1 (February 2007): 167. 
10 John Welfield, Japan and Nuclear China: Japan’s Reaction to China’s Nuclear Weapons, 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970), 1. 
 6 
In Stephen Meyer’s book The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, he hypothesizes 
motive conditions for nations acquiring nuclear weapons.11 He gave four incentives and 
then translated them into motivations, one of which was the military security incentive. 
He states that a country confronted with a military threat from one or more foreign 
powers might seek the nuclear option to increase its military capabilities.12 These threats 
could be an adversary that is nuclear armed or an adversary that has an overwhelming 
conventional military.
13
 Therefore, when the former chief of staff of Japan’s Air Defense 
Forces stated, “Japan should seek to arm itself with nuclear weapons,” in response to 




Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa stated in his article “Are U.S. Troops in Japan 
Needed?” that  “it is in the best interest of the United States, so long as it does not wish to 
see Japan withdraw from the NPT and develop its own nuclear deterrent, to maintain its 
alliance with Japan and continue to provide a nuclear umbrella.”
15
 When he stated this, he 
was discussing issues of U.S. forces in Japan. While he claimed that Japan could defend 
itself and that the need for U.S. troops was lessening, this statement signifies that security 
would be an issue. With his statement, one could argue that if Japan does not see a 
credible U.S. umbrella, there are political elites that believe Japan could see other 
countries, such as China or North Korea, as threatening enough to advance a nuclear 
option. Also, T.V. Paul’s book Power Versus Prudence makes a case for a politician 
being able to sway public opinion toward a nuclear option if they were able to show that 
a security threat existed and a nuclear deterrent were not available.
16
 
                                                 
11 Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1984), 44–74. 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid 
14 Sachiko Sakamaki, “North Korean Atomic Tests Lift Lid on Japan’s Nuclear ‘Taboo,’” accessed 
February 22, 2017, https://clareswinney.wordpress.com/2009/05/29/north-korean-atomic-tests-lift-lid-on-
japan%E2%80%99s-nuclear-%E2%80%98taboo%E2%80%99/. 
15 Morihiro Hosokawa, “Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed? Reforming the Alliance,” Foreign 4 
(July/August 1998): 5. 
16 T.V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University, 2000), 56.  
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Some authors, such as Kenneth Waltz, argue that states may feel pressure to 
balance against other nations that have nuclear weapons.17 Others like Sonali Singh and 
Christopher Way argue against that thought in their work “The Correlates of Nuclear 
Proliferation: A Quantitative Test.” Singh and Way argue that a “credible security 
guarantee” from a powerful ally would be required to null the need for nuclear 
weapons.18 Therefore, as states see the security guarantees decreasing, there will be 
greater incentive to obtain these weapons. 
Ultimately, the question becomes what will Japan choose? Those who take the 
side of norms believe that despite the changing security environment, Japan should not 
and will not obtain nuclear weapons. On the other side of the argument, Japan should 
seek its own nuclear deterrent to compete with current and possible future threats if the 
U.S. withdraws or significantly reduces its nuclear umbrella. 
 METHODS AND SOURCES D.
Case studies will be used to determine what is more important to Japan: 
maintaining its policy norms or developing security capacity against threats. Each case 
study used will be from a point where the country had to make a decision on a defense-
related issue. If the decision makers were able to maintain the status quo, then this will be 
interpreted as norms being more important to the country, resulting in Japan not obtaining 
nuclear weapons. If these case studies reveal that policies were changed or reinterpreted 
to create a more robust or offensive military for Japan, then these incidences will be 
considered as indicators that increased security capability is more important to the nation. 
This would imply Japan is likely to seek nuclear weapons as a way to maintain a credible 
nuclear deterrence. The first case study used will be the establishment of the Self Defense 
Forces. This was one of the first political debates where the question of Article 9 and the 
definition of self-defense were analyzed. The second case study will be the deployment 
of the SDF to Iraq. In 2004, the SDF deployed to Iraq for peacekeeping operations. The 
                                                 
17 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 105 
18 Sonali Sigh and Christopher R Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no.6 (2004):859-885. 
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deployment caused many to question how far self-defense extends, and divided many 
politicians on whether the deployment was constitutionally justified. The third study 
centers on the development of ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Japan. Japan has made 
significant developments in its BMD capabilities, which were established for defensive 
purposes. At the same time, BMD systems have offensive capabilities, which could be 
seen as rearmament of the Japanese military. Each case represents a time where policy 
makers in Japan debated over issues involving security and had to decide whether to 
maintain their norms, such as upholding Article 9, or developing a more robust security 
capacity was of much more concern. Multiple scholarly books, articles, and journals will 
be used to determine the government’s position on nuclear policies. Selected polls will be 
used to show public opinion about Japan’s military and changes that have been made 
throughout its history and its changing security environment. Each of these measures will 
be considered to establish consistencies or differences between political parties. 
 ORGANIZATION E.
The thesis begins with an overview of why countries would choose a nuclear 
option. It gives a brief history of the five nuclear weapon states listed with the NPT, and 
why they chose to obtain the bomb. This shows the relationship to those countries and 
Japan’s current position. The next portion of the thesis focuses on the U.S.-Japan alliance 
by using government documents to explain the security policy between Japan and the 
United States. After this, the thesis examines Japan’s status within the North East Asian 
region and why the country has decided not to make strides toward nuclear armament. 
Finally, the thesis outlines how Japan could pursue the nuclear option and some of the 
consequences of the country would go down that path. 
 9 
 UNDERSTANDING WHY COUNTRIES CHOOSE THE II.
NUCLEAR OPTION 
 INTRODUCTION A.
This chapter will identify why some countries would develop nuclear weapons. 
As part of the discussion, this chapter will examine what researchers believe would cause 
a country to nuclearize today and why countries developed nuclear weapons in the past. It 
is an important issue because the norms versus security debate can be seen from the start 
of the nuclear arms race to the eventual establishment of the NPT and major reduction of 
nuclear weapons. 
 WHY WOULD COUNTRIES NUCLEARIZE? B.
It is important to first understand what research has shown to be possible reasons 
for countries to choose a nuclear option. Most research and realists argue that countries 
tend to go down this path for security reasons. Kurt Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and 
Mitchell B. Reiss described five factors that would lead a country in this direction: “1) a 
change in the direction of U.S. foreign and security policy, 2) a breakdown of the global 
nonproliferation regime, 3) the erosion of regional or global security, 4) domestic 
imperatives, and 5) increasing in the availability of technology.”19 He explained that 
many of America’s allies depend on U.S. policies when determining their security and 
choosing not to obtain a nuclear weapon. Although the U.S. is a critical factor, it is not 
the only factor. In addition, not all five factors would have to happen for a country to 
choose the nuclear option. Scott Sagan created three models on why a country will build 
or abstain from the nuclear option. His security model showed that countries might build 
nuclear weapons for national security, such as China developing nuclear weapons for fear 
of a possible attack from the United States, and London and Paris building weapons for 
the perceived Soviet threat.20 The domestic politics model argued that nuclear weapons 
                                                 
19 Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why 
States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2004), 20. 
20 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter, 1996–1997): 54–86, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539273. 
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could be used as a way to serve the interest of multiple nation states.21 Finally, his norms 
model believes that states obtain nuclear weapons because they are symbolic of a states 
“modernity and identity.”22 While he agreed that most cases of proliferation could be 
argued with the security model, he also argued that “multicausality” was the primary 
factor.  
 WHY DID THE BIG 5 DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS? C.
Understanding why the five nuclear weapon states developed a program will be 
able to give some insight to possible reasons for Japan choosing to go down the same 
path. The five nuclear weapon states’ programs started in the 1940s, first with the United 
States and the last being China. The reasons the countries developed the weapons tend to 
circle around security, but some also saw the weapons as a sign of status and prestige in 
the international realm.23 Like Japan, two of the NWS (France and the United Kingdom) 
are allies with the U.S. and were under the U.S. extended deterrence when they started 
their programs. In relation to the Norms versus Security debate, if they were to have 
observed a norms rationale, the two countries would have maintained the status quo of 
the time and relied on the U.S. for defense. The two countries felt security was of greater 
concern and relying on the U.S. would not have been in their best interest. There are also 
similarities between the threat perception of the U.S. that China saw and the threat 
perception of China that Japan may see. 
1. The United States 
In 1945, the United States conducted the first successful detonation of a nuclear 
device, and in that same year, the only two nuclear weapons ever used in war were 
detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This was the beginning of the United States 
period of dominance when it came to military power. For this brief period before the 
Soviet’s first nuclear detonation, the United States focus was on air power. The quick 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 63. 
22 Ibid., 73. Scott Sagan’s norms model is somewhat different from the norms argument of the Norms 
versus Security debate. His norms model not only sees norms as a restraint but also as reason a country 
would obtain nuclear weapons for prestige. 
23 Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 43 
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surrender of Japan after the detonation over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the sheer power 
of the atomic bomb, gave the United States a sense of invincibility. This would lead to 
the establishment of the Strategic Air Command. A significant drawback of the nuclear 
bomb was the delivery method. The device could only be carried by air during this 
period. On the other hand, the atomic bomb was less expensive when compared to 
conventional weapons. However, the United States was arguably the most powerful 
nation with the nuclear bomb, the country wanted to focus on stopping wars rather than 
waging wars. The atomic bomb could be used as a device for coercion. National security 
would be seen as the ability to strike an enemy with an overwhelming and devastating 
attack if they were to take any aggressive acts against the U.S. Jonathan Winkler found 
that the increase in the U.S. nuclear stockpile was a result of many reason, but 
highlighted three. First, the U.S. did not have accurate information on Soviet industrial 
forces. Second, they feared Soviet conventional forces and saw tactical weapons as a way 
to counter the threat. Third, President Eisenhower wanted to preserve peace with a large 
nuclear arsenal. Eisenhower believed that threatening nuclear war deterred adversaries 
and prevented allies from acting.24 In the end, the U.S. developed nuclear weapons as a 
form of security. Even the first use of the atomic bomb was to break the Japanese spirit 
and coerce them into surrendering. Although nuclear weapons could be used as a tool for 
coercion, little research shows Japan seeking that ability and as of writing this thesis, 
Japan has not declared war on any country. However, Japan may seek a nuclear option as 
a way to maintain peace as the U.S. wanted to do in the past. 
2. Soviet Union / Russia 
The Soviet nuclear weapons program began in 1943 during World War II once 
the Soviets learned of the United States’ research through espionage.25 The acceleration 
of the Soviet nuclear weapons program can be seen as a direct result of the U.S. nuclear 
detonation over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Soviet Union was looking to maintain its 
status as a superpower with the United States, the country’s military rival, and feared 
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containment from American allies.26 At first, the Soviets would try to downplay the value 
of nuclear weapons in the international realm. The Soviets opposed the Baruch Plan of 
1948 and wanted the United States to eliminate all nuclear arms rather than the U.S. 
giving its weapons to the United Nations. At this time, the United States had less than 
sixty nuclear weapons, and the Soviets were working on their own nuclear weapons 
program. In 1949, the Soviet Union conducted its first successful test of a nuclear 
weapon. After this, both the United States and the Soviet Union began to increase 
spending on development of higher quality and greater quantities of nuclear weapons. 
Currently, Russia is the second largest nuclear power, and nuclear weapons remain an 
essential part of their military strategy.27 Japan is not a position of rivalry with another 
country. Even after North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and announcement that it 
had a nuclear weapon, Japan would discuss the nuclear option, but would still rely on the 
extended deterrence of the U.S. A nuclear Japan could also destabilize the region and 
possibly lead to an arms race between the country and either China or North Korea. 
3. Great Britain/United Kingdom 
The U.K. was actually the first country to look into the development of nuclear 
weapons. Tube Alloy was the codename given to the research and development program, 
which, due to budget issues, would eventually be assimilated into the Manhattan Project. 
The United States would then take over the project and stop sharing research with the 
U.K.
28
 After World War II, the U.S. would further restrict information regarding nuclear 
technology with the McMahon Act even though it originally agreed to share information 
at the start of the Manhattan project with the Quebec Agreement. Winston Churchill 
believed that if the U.K. did not develop its own nuclear deterrent, it would lose its place 
as a first-class power, and the country would have to rely on the United States for the 
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effectiveness of their defense.
29
 Historian Margaret Gowing believed the British 
developed the bomb because they felt that 
Britain must possess so climacteric a weapon in order to deter an 
atomically armed enemy, a feeling that Britain as a great power must 
acquire all major new weapons, a feeling that atomic weapons were a 
manifestation of the scientific and technological superiority on which 
Britain’s strength, so deficient if measured in sheer numbers of men, must 
depend.30  
Japan, like the U.K., is a close ally of the U.S. and can potentially obtain 
information on technology regarding nuclear weapons. However, Japan is not seeking to 
become a world power through military force. The country is mainly seeking to become a 
“normal” nation through modernization of its current military.31 During the period when 
the U.K. developed its first nuclear weapon, the country was concerned with the Soviet 
Union. Part of their concern with the U.S. nuclear umbrella was that even though the U.S. 
could attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union could not strike 
the U.S. back. The United Kingdom feared this made them a potential target for 
retaliation and decided the country needed its own nuclear deterrent.32 North Korea was 
able to launch a missile that reached within 200 nautical miles of Japan, creating concern 
for the country. In the same way, the U.K. was concerned that a retaliatory strike against 
the U.S. would fall on its country, the Japanese may see the same in relation to North 
Korea. 
4. France 
France has the third largest nuclear arsenal after the United States and Russia. 
France began its nuclear weapons program after the Suez Crisis. After the international 
fallout, the French believed that developing nuclear weapons was necessary for them to 
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maintain their independence and support their interests. President Charles de Gaulle 
would be one of the pivotal voices pushing for research and development in the program. 
Since the development of their first nuclear weapon, France has come to see the weapons 
as a symbol of prestige.33 The weapons have become a major pillar of France’s defense 
strategy, which was shown with former President Jacques Chirac’s nuclear deterrence 
doctrine announced in January 2006.34 France felt being able to have its own nuclear 
deterrent for security was more important than a security guarantee from another state. 
Japan is concerned with the U.S. extended deterrence and has sought reassurance of it in 
response to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. There has not been any invasion of 
Japan that has put pressure on the country to seek a nuclear deterrent as in the case of 
France. 
5. China 
China began its nuclear weapons program in the late 1950s. It is believed that 
China pursued the nuclear option as a result of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Some 
scholars think that the backing down of the PRC was partly because of the fear of an 
American nuclear attack. Although China has agreed to decrease its nuclear arsenal in 
accordance with the NPT, it is believed it has have doubled its weapon stockpile.35 Susan 
Turner Haynes showed in her research that the main reason for China’s buildup of 
nuclear weapons is mainly because of a perceived threat, in particular the United States.36 
Japan sees China’s growing military as a concern for security, just as China saw the 
United States as a concern when the country developed its nuclear weapons program. 
This will be discussed more in the next chapter; China could be a factor that leads Japan 
to pursuing a nuclear option. 
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As we can see the five nuclear weapon states were focused on security when 
developing their nuclear weapons and creating their doctrines for employment. Most 
debates were not about why or if a country should develop nuclear weapons, but on how 
they should be used. France was focused on deterring outside threats from other major 
powers. The U.K. was concerned with remaining one of the major powers, not having to 
rely on the U.S. for protection, and with a retaliatory strike of the Soviet’s against the 
U.S. China was trying to defend itself against a strike from the U.S., fearing that not 
having the bomb left them vulnerable to an attack. The Soviet Union would try to 
maintain an equal standing with the U.S. from a strategic military perspective. Finally, 
the United States would not only maintain but also use nuclear weapons as a means of 
coercion. In the case of Japan, is security a big enough aspect to push for a nuclear 
option? The current threats to Japan are China and North Korea. The former being one of 
the Nuclear Weapon States, and one of the five that is actually believed to be increasing 
their nuclear arsenal. The latter being the only country to withdraw from the NPT and 
currently pursuing development of nuclear weapon. Japan is concerned with deterring 
these threats. Right now, the other option for Japan would be to maintain its current 
defense doctrine of relying on the U.S. for protection from a nuclear threat. In the next 
chapter, there will be a discussion on the factors affecting Japan. It will show that Japan 
is not completely constrained by its constitution, although domestic opinion will be a 
factor deterring the push for nuclear weapons. It will also show that Japan is concerned 
with its security in relation to the U.S. extended deterrence, and that the threat of North 
Korea and China could potentially sway the country toward a nuclear option. 
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 WHY WOULD JAPAN GO DOWN THIS PATH? III.
 INTRODUCTION A.
This chapter will focus on some of the factors that could lead to Japan choosing a 
nuclear option and the reasons Japan has not chosen this path. As stated previously, the 
two sides of the debate focus on norms versus security, with security being the reason a 
nation would choose to go down this path. Two factors under security are a perceived 
threat from an outside force and an uncertain defensive posture. This thesis will consider 
a perceived threat to be anything that Japan knows or has known to be a possible issue for 
their security environment. An uncertain defensive posture would be possible changes to 
Japan’s defense where the outcome cannot be accurately determined. Both could come 
into effect with regard to Japan. 
 THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY TREATY B.
With Article 9 in place, Japan would have no standing military that could be used 
to resolve international disputes. Although Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF) is equipped 
with conventional weapons, they can only be used in the defense of national security. 
This removed Japan’s ability for pre-emptive strikes, placed a restriction on Japan’s 
ability to defend itself, presented Japan as a pacifist country, and would be the basis for 
future debates. In order to maintain some kind of military, the Japanese and the United 
States entered into an agreement known as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security between the United States and Japan. The treaty, which was divided into five 
articles, stated that the United States would be allowed to move forces onto Japanese 
territories to support its East Asian military presence. The agreement also prohibited 
Japan from providing other countries with bases or rights without first receiving 
permission from the U.S. The treaty also requires the U.S. to come to the aid of Japan if 
the nation were attacked by another.37 The treaty is considered one of the pillars of 
Japan’s national defense. Japan is also one of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), 
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and signed the NPT under the pretense that the country would be protected from nuclear 
attack by the extended deterrence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Japan signed the NPT in 
1970, but did not ratify the treaty till 1976. Katsuhisa Furukawa found that Japan wanted 
to at least maintain a “latent nuclear capability,” which would force the U.S. to provide a 
nuclear deterrent to sustain the Japan-U.S. security.38  
 WHY JAPAN HAS CHOSEN NOT TO OBTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS C.
1. Domestic Opinion 
Any issue revolving around nuclear topics has always been met with controversy. 
Domestic opinion tends to favor continuation of current policies where the country 
abstains from nuclear weapons. Many scholars refer to this commitment to not pursue a 
nuclear option as a “nuclear allergy.” A major setback for the proliferation side of the 
debate was the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011. This major incident was when a 
tsunami disabled the power supply and cooling of three reactors at Fukushima Daiichi.39 
Although no deaths were caused due to acute radiation syndrome, many anti-nuclear 
protests were made. A poll conducted in 2011 and again in 2012 showed that 70 percent 
of the Japanese believed that the use of nuclear power should be reduced.40 In September 
of 2011, an estimated 20,000 protesters marched in Tokyo to seek for the government to 
no longer pursue nuclear power as an option.41 Even the district of Ohi was divided on 
whether to continue to use nuclear power, even though the community has thrived since 
the 1970s because of the nuclear plants. During the time of the incident the mayor of Ohi, 
Tokioka, became split on the idea. He wanted new guidelines for operations, but 
understood the reactors would eventually need to be restarted if the economy would be 
                                                 
38 Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan’s Policy and Views on Nuclear Weapon: A Historical Perspective,” 
Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics, & Studies 37 (2012): 12. 
39 “Fukushima Accident,” World Nuclear Association, accessed February 22, 2017, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx. 
40 “Japanese Wary of Nuclear Energy,” PewResearchCenter, accessed February 22, 2017. 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/05/japanese-wary-of-nuclear-energy/ 




affected by the benefits of using the reactors.42 Many have pointed to the pacifist 
education and survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as factors affecting public opinion to 
remain opposed to the idea of nuclearizing.43 Although the populations directly affected 
by the bombs are beginning to become smaller, their influence is still felt throughout the 
country. As Mike Mochizuki pointed out, the public ceremonies for Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki will make sure that the people of Japan will never forget.44 Llewelyn Hughes 
noted that polling data showed only 21 percent of the population believed that Japan 
should have nuclear weapons in 1968 and those numbers would continually drop.45 By 
1994, her data would show that only nine percent of the population believed that Japan 
should have a nuclear weapon if North Korea had one. The paper noted that after the 
North Korean nuclear test of 2006, 46 percent of the public believed the question of 
nuclearizing should be debated, while 51 percent still opposed the idea.46 For public 
opinion to change over the perception of nuclear weapons, international issues, such as a 
threat from another country, would have to be extreme.  
2. Policy Constraints 
Japan ratified the NPT in 1970, and under the NPT, Japan is considered a non-
nuclear weapon state (NNWS). Therefore, the country is unable to proliferate either on its 
own or from a nuclear weapon state (NWS). The only way would be for the country to 
withdraw from the treaty, which requires three months’ notice. The only country to have 
ever withdrawn from the treaty is North Korea. Arguments have been made that Article 9 
of the Japanese constitution does not allow country to obtain nuclear weapons because of 
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its offensive capabilities, even though experts argue that the weapons have more of a 
defensive purpose. The meaning of defensive purpose being that having nuclear weapons 
creates an incentive for a state to not take military action against another through 
deterrence. Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin believe that Article 9 is the 
most prominent factor precluding Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons because it 
prohibits Japan’s “right to belligerency,” but also wrote that the constitution could allow 
nuclear weapons for defensive purposes.47 Foreign law specialist Sayuri Umeda did 
research on explaining Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Umeda noted that 
paragraph 1 of Article 9 renounces war and paragraph 2 says that Japan can never 
maintain land forces, sea forces, air forces as well as other potentials for war.48 Umeda 
agrees with other scholars and government officials that Article 9 does not prohibit 
Japan’s right to self-defense and allows the country to expand its capability in the pursuit 
of defense.49 Therefore, if one views nuclear weapons as defensive measures, the 
argument can be made that Article 9 does allow for the development of this capability. 
Japanese politicians such as Prime Minister Takei Fukuda and Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe have even said that the constitution allows for nuclear weapons to be a possibility if 
they are in a minimum capacity like the Japanese Self Defense Force.50 
Katsushi Furukawa described two parts of the Japan’s nuclear, or non-nuclear, 
policy. One of the reasons Japan has chosen to shy away from the nuclear weapons is to 
support the three non-nuclear principles: non-production, non-possession, and non-
introduction.51 These principles were adopted by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in the Diet 
session of 1967, and are almost identical to the requirements of a NNWS. These 
principles have been referred to multiple times since they were established, including by 
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Prime Minister Shinzo Abe after the North Korean nuclear test in 2006. The second part 
of Japan’s nuclear policy was declared by Prime Minister Sato in 1968. The Four Nuclear 
Pillars are “1) adhere to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, 2) pursue global nuclear 
disarmament, 3) limit the use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes, and 4) rely on the 
U.S. extended deterrence.”
52
 Japan is a strong advocate of promoting the peaceful use of 
nuclear power.  
 WHAT WOULD CAUSE JAPAN TO PURSUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS? D.
1. The Shrinking of the U.S. Umbrella 
Former President Barak Obama outlined a goal of the United States becoming a 
nation with no nuclear weapons. He looked to move into consistency of Article 6 of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 2011, the New START came into effect, continuing the 
reduction of the U.S. and Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Since then there has been an increase 
in political leaders in Japan requiring the assurance of the U.S. extended deterrence. The 
Japanese are looking at their current security environment with China and North Korea, 
China being one of the Nuclear Weapon States and North Korea being the only country 
to have withdrawn from the NPT. 
There is no exact number or factor stated used to determine how much the U.S. 
umbrella must shrink to cause Japan to seek a nuclear option. Unclassified research does 
not show a specific number of nuclear missiles that the U.S. must maintain for Japan, or 
any country under the extended deterrent umbrella, to feel secure from potential threats. 
There are signs that show that Japan does have concerns when the U.S. has made changes 
to either its nuclear policy or nuclear arsenal. In an interview conducted by Maria Rost 
Rublee, a Japanese defense expert claimed that the best way to stop Japan from seeking a 
nuclear option would be for the U.S. to maintain the security alliance with Japan.53 Maria 
Rost also noted that this does not mean a nuclear capable deterrent. She noted that 
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conventional forces could supplement the nuclear option.54 Some researchers also believe 
that a reduced nuclear umbrella could have a negative effect. This was argued in a 2007 
study by the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB). The 
study concluded that “nuclear umbrella security agreements, whether unilateral or 
multilateral, have been, and are expected to continue to be effective deterrents to 
proliferation.” The report also stated, that “there is clear evidence in diplomatic channels 
that U.S. assurance to include the nuclear umbrella have been, and continue to be, the 
single most important reason many allies have foresworn nuclear weapons.”55 The ISAB 
believed that “a lessening of the U.S. nuclear umbrella could very well trigger a cascade 
in East Asia and the Middle East.”56 The cascade effect included Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan. The report also maintained that the security assurance provided could be 
considered in terms of more than just nuclear weapons, and the strength could be seen in 
the form of troops and money spent on other offensive and defensive programs.57 Of 
note, although there is a sentiment that deterrence may require nuclear missiles, there is 
also a thought that a deterrent does not require them. However, a deterrent of some means 
must exist. For instance, during an international nonproliferation conference, Ambassador 
Yukio Satoh, from the Japan Institute of International Affairs, stated “Strategically, 
Japan’s adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles depends largely, if not solely, 
upon the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, or more specifically, the 
credibility of the United States’ commitment to provide deterrence for Japan.”58  
2. The Changing Security Environment 
Japan’s changing security environment mainly focuses on China and North 
Korea’s conventional and nuclear forces. Both countries have steadily increased their 
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conventional forces. China is one of the NWS under the NPT and North Korea has 
renounced the treaty and developed its own nuclear weapons program.   
a. China’s Conventional Forces 
David Shambaugh wrote that most, if not all, of the modernization in equipment, 
personnel, and doctrine is due to what China has seen as changes in threats in the 
region.59 As China is a growing hegemon in the Asian region, it is at continued odds with 
the United States. After the Sino-Soviet split, China lost a major ally and support for 
modernization. China has been an ally of North Korea in an effort to stop the United 
States from moving closer to its borders.60 Although with North Korea removing itself 
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and making threats to use nuclear weapons, China may 
be drawn into a war it does not wish to be in at this time. In addition, mainland China 
wants to reclaim Taiwan, but the United States has a mutual defense treaty with the 
island. China is not fully prepared to get into a war with the U.S. at this time. It is 
important to understand China’s conventional forces and their perception of the region. 
Maria Rost Rublee believed Japan sees China’s conventional forces as a long-term 
problem for security only balanced by the U.S.-Japan alliance. She argued that Japan also 
sees the country as a potential adversary for its relationship with the U.S.61 An interview 
she conducted with a defense expert showed that Japan may seek a nuclear option if the 
U.S. were to side with China, although it would not be immediate or likely.62 China sees 
Japan’s alliance with the U.S., as part of the United States’ hegemonic push into the 
region. There have been realist arguments made that some states may seek a nuclear 
option and forgo development in conventional forces as way to “achieve effective parity 
against a stronger nation.”63 If the U.S. were to abandon Japan, or if the Japanese were to 
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believe that the U.S. was not maintaining a credible deterrent for conventional forces, 
Japan may seek nuclearization to ensure parity with China’s conventional forces. 
b. China’s Nuclear Weapon’s Program 
China has a nuclear weapons stockpile of approximately 240 nuclear weapons, 
including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), intermediate-range Ballistic 
Missiles (IRBMs), short-range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM), medium-range ballistic 
Missiles (MRBMs), submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), and strategic 
bombers.64 The purpose of China’s nuclear modernization program is to make an 
effective deterrent with changes to its security environment. These changes include the 
shift in the United States nuclear posture, an increase in nuclear weapon states in the East 
Asian region (North Korea), and the U.S. development of ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) capabilities.65 After China’s first nuclear test, leaders of the Liberal Democratic 
Party (of Japan) wanted to revisit the country’s stance on nuclear weapons. Prime 
Minister Sato, recommended that Japan would need to have a nuclear deterrent if 
Communist China also had the weapons.66 His views would change later in the form of 
the four nuclear principles. Ariana Navarro Rowberry wrote that although China’s 
nuclear arsenal is somewhat modest, the modernizing of their nuclear forces are a cause 
for concern and an important factor in the changing threat perception for Japan.67 
Ambassador Yukio Satoh even stated that there were three sources of nuclear threat to 
Japan, the first one being nuclear weapon states in the East Asian region to include 
China.68 Although, he believed that a country like China “would make rational strategic 
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calculations,” he believed that negotiations would assist in reducing this threat.69 His 
opinion was that the U.S. would need to maintain a credible deterrence for its allies 
[Japan] as long as other countries maintain a nuclear threat. 
c. North Korea’s Conventional Forces 
The Korean People’s Army (KPA) comprises the military forces of North Korea,  
the sixth largest military in the world. The five branches of the KPA are the Ground 
Force, Navy, Air Force, Strategic Rocket Forces, and Special Operation Force. Some see 
North Korea’s conventional forces as a potential threat to Japan. The Asahi Shimbun was 
noted as saying, “Some believe the threat posed to Japan by North Korea means that 
nuclear weapons should also serve to deter biological and chemical weapon strikes.”
70 
While biological and chemical weapon are their own type of warfare, this statement does 
show that some Japanese politicians do know of the deterring factor of a nuclear arsenal.  
d. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon’s Program 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program presents a new and potentially perilous 
dynamic among the Northeast Asian states. After North Korea’s withdrawal from the 
NPT, North Korea became a nuclear state in 2006. With its continued experimentation 
and increased success, many experts fear a domino effect in the development of nuclear 
arms in the region. As the global response to North Korea’s development of nuclear 
weapons was insufficient in stopping the advancement of North Korea’s program, other 
nations may be encouraged to cancel participation in the NPT.71 These states will 
economically prepare for sanctions in advance, as they build their own nuclear programs. 
If another nation, like Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea, were to withdraw from the NPT, 
other nations in the region would feel compelled to engage in their own programs to 
show strength and create a deterrent from their neighbors. In the past, South Korea and 
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Taiwan conducted experiments in processing plutonium. In addition, Japan has a 
stockpile of plutonium available for weapon production if motivated. 
Beyond proliferation of nuclear arms in the region, North Korea’s nuclear 
program has other implications. One is North Korea’s determination and resilience. 
Nations have issued sanctions in response to North Korea’s nuclear testing. An example 
of the sanctions against North Korea by just a single nation, Japan, include restricting 
North Korean imports, preventing entry of North Korean citizens, and closing ports to 
North Korean ships.72 Japan also led the charge for the UNSC to pass a resolution 
denouncing the July 2006 missile test. In addition, Japan froze North Korean bank assets. 
The U.S. military continues conducting inspections of North Korean cargo ships with the 
assistance of Japanese forces. Other nations have enacted similar sanctions. North 
Korea’s continued testing of nuclear weapons despite these heavy sanctions limiting their 
economic growth and trade networks is a demonstration of its determination. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to infer that Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal will only increase in potency.  
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been one of the factors that could 
lead Japan to pursuing a nuclear option.73 There are some who see the nuclear 
development as an issue for Japan. Prime Minister Sato even said that having the “will 
that we can do it ourselves” would be important if North Korea developed nuclear 
weapon.
74
 A poll conducted by Dong-A Ilbo found that 80 percent of the Japanese people 
maintained an unfavorable opinion with regard to North Korea, 57 percent saw the 
country as the most threatening to Japan’s security, and 85 percent felt threatened by 
North Korea’s nuclear development.75 In his book The Evolution of the Nuclear Strategy, 
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Lawrence Freedman wrote that North Korea saw Japan as a security concern and part of 
the reason the country developed nuclear weapons.76 North Korea was even adamant 
about Japan participating in the six-party talks, saying that Japan should be dealt with 
“arms, not words.”77  
One would be inclined to agree with Maria Rost Rublee that Korea is a short-term 
threat for Japan, but if a nuclear attack were to come from North Korea it would increase 
the potential for Japan to seek a nuclear option.78 The main actions that Japan has done in 
the past in regard to North Korea’s nuclear development have been to push for further 
discussion on having a nuclear option, upholding the three non-nuclear principles, and to 
seek reassurance and continue to rely on the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. 
One can assume that if North Korea were to continue to proliferate that sanctions would 
increase. In the case of Japan, the country’s continued push for the U.S. to reassure the 
country of the stability of the extended deterrence shows that that North Korea is a factor 
in its decision-making process. Japan’s decision to follow the three non-nuclear 
Principles is based largely on the U.S. extended deterrence. If North Korea continued to 
proliferate, or had no intention of decreasing its nuclear arsenal, and the United States 
extended deterrence shrank below what Japan considered reliable, it would be reasonable 
to assume that Japan would choose to proliferate on its own.  
 CONCLUSION E.
In the previous chapter, this paper explained why some countries chose the 
nuclear option. One of the principal factors being security concerns. Japan has some 
security concerns in the form of North Korea’s and China’s conventional and nuclear 
forces. Also, there is the concern over the shrinking U.S. nuclear umbrella as some of 
Japan’s adversaries are maintaining a nuclear force. Domestic and political factors will be 
the leading factors for Japan choosing to not to go down this path. In the past, speaking 
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about a nuclear weapon was considered taboo, but the debate continues to arise when 
there are changes in these factors. The next chapter will cover political debates in Japan, 
to see if the country has chosen the side of norm or security in the past. It will argue that 
when Japan felt the need, it would amend or reinterpret policies when faced with a 
security dilemma.  
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 HAS JAPAN CHANGED IN THE PAST? IV.
 INTRODUCTION A.
This chapter will discuss three cases where Japan had to choose between making 
changes to policies in favor of a more robust military capability or maintaining its current 
military stance. Although there are many cases that could be broken down into the debate 
of norms versus security, these were chosen because they each represent a significant 
change in the military or policies. The first case study will be the establishment of the 
Japanese Self-Defense Force. After WWII, Japan was left with no standing military to 
protect its borders. It was believed that under Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution the 
country could not possess the ability to maintain a military. This thought process would 
change when the country was faced with the threat of North Korea. The next case will be 
the deployment of the SDF to Iraq. This will show how the government of Japan used the 
issue as a way to extend the reach of the SDF. The government was able to send troops 
despite public opposition. It would also be the first time Japan would have troops in a 
combat zone since the end of WWII. The final case will be the Japanese move into 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). This case goes into the definition of collective self-
defense. The cases suggest that overall, Japan does look at security and its environment 
as factors in determining what it will do when faced with a decision to increase its 
military capability, but other variables can affect the decisions of the country. 
 CASE STUDY I: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SDF B.
1. How the SDF Came to Be 
After its defeat in World War II, Japan would give up its ability to be a military 
power. The Supreme Commander of Allied Powers would create a group to draft Japan’s 
new constitution. The new constitution, sometimes known as the pacifist constitution, 
came into effect in May of 1947. As mentioned in chapter one, Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution rescinded Japan’s sovereign right to war and did not allow the country to 
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maintain “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential.”
79
 As some would 
argue, such as Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, this removed Japan’s ability to defend 
itself through war. When asked during the 90
th
 Diet session, Yoshida replied 
Regarding the article of the draft constitution concerning renunciation of 
war, it looks as though you think war based on the self-defense right of the 
state is justifiable, but I think it is harmful to admit such a thing. Most 
wars have been fought in the cause of self-defense, so that it is better to 
wage no war at all in any cases. To acknowledge and justify a war in self-




As North Korean forces moved into South Korea, Japan would begin to have 
concerns over its defense. In 1950, General MacArthur, who had already stated he did not 
believe that Article 9 prohibited Japan’s right to self-defense, sent a letter to Prime 
Minister Yoshida. The letter would direct the government of Japan to establish the 
National Police Reserve (NPR).
81 
Yoshida would state that the purpose of the NPR was to 
keep peace and not for military purposes. The NPR would handle internal issues while, 
under Article 1 of the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, the U.S. 
would contribute the international security of Japan. Under the Security Treaty, Japan 
was required to continue to increase its own defense in an effort to assume more 
responsibility in defending against aggression.
82 
This would be further emphasized in 
Article VIII of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.
83
 The NPR would be 
reorganized to the National Safety Force in 1952, which would be reorganized again in 
1954. In 1954 the Self Defense Force (SDF) would be established, being divided into 
three branches. The three components are the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF), the 
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Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF). Since 
then Japan has continued to build up its forces to this day.
84
 
2. What Were the Debates? 
The question then becomes what were some of the debates around the 
establishment of the Japan SDF? As was mentioned earlier, one of primary debates 
stemmed from if the SDF was constitutional, or if the force contradicted the idea of 
Article 9. In 1973 the District Court of Sapporo found that the SDF violated Article 9. A 
case in which the issues stemmed from a surface to air missile base being built. Residents 
of the area did not agree with the base being built on a forest preserve and challenged the 
constitutionality of the SDF. The government would argue that the SDF was not for the 
purpose of war and that all countries have the right of self-defense.
85
 Public opinion of 
the SDF was mainly positive, especially in the ability of the SDF to support disaster relief 
operation inside the country.
86
 Most of the Japanese people do not favor the SDF being 
used for combat operations, although they understand the need to be able to defend the 
country. 
3. What Was the Outcome? 
Since its establishment 1954, the SDF has been deployed to Golan Heights, 
Indonesia, and Afghanistan for peacekeeping operations. While they showed the ability 
of the SDF to be used outside of the country, there were still guidelines and restrictions in 
place to maintain the pacifist ideology of the force. The debates over the SDF have 
caused the passing of several laws to include the Regional Contingency Security Law, 
revising the 1954 Self Defense Force Law, and continued debate over revising the 
constitution.87 At first, the issue of self-defense was at the forefront of the debate, but 
then a shift to Japan taking a larger role not only in its own defense, but in international 
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operations would take place. The establishment of the SDF shows that when Japan was 
faced with and external threat it would choose to build a more robust military. Also, 
when debate rose over whether the SDF was legal, the government would argue that the 
primary purpose of the SDF was just for defense. This could come into play if Japan were 
to choose a nuclear option. Public opinion has not moved in support of nuclear weapons, 
and the weapons could be argued unconstitutional. Just like with the establishment of the 
SDF, the government of Japan could make the argument that the weapons are for defense 
purposes only. 
 CASE STUDY II: SENDING THE SDF TO IRAQ C.
1. How Did This Come About? 
During the Gulf War, Japan had been criticized for its “checkbook diplomacy” in 
which the country contributed financial support but did not send any troops. This would 
play a factor in the country’s choice to send troops to Iraq in 2004. Debates on issues 
would rise out of this event to include “1) the continued efficacy of the renunciation of 
the use of force; 2) the importance of contributing manpower to the international 
community in times of crisis; 3) a more equitable division of roles and missions within 
the U.S. -Japan alliance; and 4) the desirability of a more independent foreign policy.”88 
The SDF’s missions were expanded in the new National Defense program to include 
disaster relief and international peace keeping.  
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States would send troops to 
Iraq. On the day of the attack Prime Minister Koizumi would look to support the “war on 
terror,” by establishing the Iraq Response Team. The group would conclude that under 
the current Peace Keeping Operations Law, they could not justify deploying the SDF. 
Koizumi would then call for the law to be redrafted. The new law would restrict SDF 
personnel to noncombat zones and allowed for support in logistics and intelligence. 
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2. What Were the Debates? 
Once again, the issue of Article 9 came up. The debate being that the constitution 
allowed for “minimum necessary force,” but did not allow for forces to be sent abroad 
and for collective self-defense. Another concern was the possibility of sending troops into 
combat zones. The majority of the public believed that the SDF was primarily for disaster 
relief. A survey conducted in 2004 showed that 46.8 percent believed that the current 
level of support the SDF was giving in support of peace keeping operation was 
sufficient.89 Only 22.2 percent of those people felt they should do more, while 17.7 
percent felt they should participate at a minimum level.90 Prime Minister Koizumi not 
only used the fear of North Korea, but the abandonment of the U.S. to gain support for 
sending troops into Iraq.91 
3. What Was the Outcome? 
The decision was made to dispatch 1,000 troops to Iraq in 2004. The personnel 
were defended by British and Dutch forces due to the fact they were not permitted to use 
force. They were only there for building structures such as hospitals, roads, and water 
treatment facilities.
92
 In the case of the sending troops to Iraq, the government of Japan 
did not change a policy based on security, rather on a need to be more involved in world 
affairs, and trying to remove its past criticism of having only “checkbook diplomacy.” 
The country would show that it had the will to take a larger role in the alliance with the 
U.S. Although, Minister Koizumi was able to use the fear of the U.S. isolating Japan and 
leaving the country to deal with its own defense, it was not the primary factor in changing 
policy. Shirzad Azad believed that Japan’s foreign policy toward the Persian Gulf and 
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Saddam’s Iraq were factors that also contributed to Japan sending troops to the region.93 
When faced with pressure from outside factors to contribute to the Iraq War, Japan 
moved from what the country normally did and sent troops. The government of Japan 
could do the same if it were to pursue a nuclear option in the future. Koizumi used the 
fear of U.S. abandonment to help gain support for sending troops to Iraq. A diminishing 
U.S. nuclear umbrella could be seen as the same, and used to help gain favor for a nuclear 
option for Japan. 
 CASE STUDY III: JAPAN AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE D.
1. What Led to the Japanese Interest in BMD? 
Japan’s interest in missile defense programs dates back to the mid-1980s, but the 
1998 launch of the Taepo Dong-1 is what led to political talks about ballistic missile 
defense. The missile showed that it was possible for a perceived threat to reach the shores 
of Japanese land, and even with the public knowledge of the U.S. promised defense of the 
country, that threat may be willing to do it. The demonstration showed the vulnerability 
of the Japanese to a possible attack from North Korea. After this demonstration, the 
Japanese Security Council would collaborate with the U.S. on research of Navy Theatre 
Wide Defense. Japan has specific threats in regard to ballistic missile defense. The threat 
of Japan and U.S. forces being targeted by North Korea, China, and Russia as well as 
non-state actors and terrorist are two mentioned by the authors of Japan and Ballistic 
Missile Defense.94  
2. What Were the Debates? 
In Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense, the authors noted that there were many 
benefits to Japan acquiring its own BMD system. The first benefit being the ability of 
Japan to counter potential threats from countries such as China and North Korea. 
Secondly, increasing the defense of Japan also increases the defense of U.S. troops in 
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Japan. The authors believed that this would cause the U.S. to want to increase its defense 
of Japan as the U.S. would see Japan as an even greater asset. Finally, Japan investing in 
BMD could help in counter proliferation efforts.95 
There is also the debate on collective self-defense in which Japanese politicians 
have argued that Article 9 does not allow for collective self-defense. Collective self-
defense is a security agreement in which one party believes that a threat to another is a 
threat to all. With this ideology, one nation is allowed to defend another even if the 
former is not the target of the adversary of the latter. Japan has long interpreted Article 9 
to only allow for the defense of Japan, Japanese assets, and Japanese personnel. This is 
seen in the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty in which the U.S. is required to come to 
the aid of Japan if an attack occurs on Japanese land, but the Japanese have no obligation 
to do the same.96  
Defense Agency Director-General Gen Nakatani even stated that Japan could not 
provide military backing to another country unless Japan were under attack itself, which 
would lead to Japan having to no longer partake in the U.S. missile defense program.97 
His interpretation of Article 9 and collective self-defense did not allow for this sort of 
support. Some critics would argue that it may be impossible to determine which country 
was being targeted by an adversary’s missile, and if intercepted by Japan, could place the 
country in a position that it did not intend to be in.98 On the other side of the argument, 
officials such as Director General Shigeru Ishiba believes that the only issue is whether 
the country had the right to defend itself against a ballistic missile. He would be 
supported by Osamu Akiyama, who argued that it did not matter whether Japan was the 
intended target of a ballistic missile, but if the country judged a missile to be a threat they 
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could apply the right to self-defense. This would make any interception of a ballistic 
missile constitutional.99 
Of the political parties in Japan there is much debate over BMD. The Democrats 
and the Communist oppose BMD, believing that China and North Korea are not credible 
threats. The Komeito party, and pacifist party, believe that BMD constitute collective self-
defense. The Komeito party also believes that BMD and continued involvement with the 
U.S. is provoking China and further destabilizing the region. To the public, the Liberal 
Democratic Party supports BMD. Although, there is some divide within the party.100  
3. What Was the Outcome? 
In an effort to continue the pursuit of BMD capabilities the constitution was 
reinterpreted to allow for a different type of collective self-defense. Japan’s current 
security policy allows for “limited” collective self-defense. Japan can intervene if “an 
armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs 
and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn 
fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure 
Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.”
101
 Japan has also continued to increase the 
capabilities of its Aegis-Equipped destroyers with ballistic defense capability, and is 
working with the U.S. on an Advanced Ballistic Missile Interceptor.
102
 Many Japanese 
officials support research and development in BMD capabilities due to the increasing 
threat of North Korea and China. This case could be one of the most significant in 
determining if security is more important than norms. It shows how when faced with an 
external threat Japan would choose to reinterpret a policy to actively pursue a more 
robust military. 
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 CONCLUSION E.
When looking at the cases above, it is possible to infer that Japan does feel a need 
to reinterpret and revise some policies when faced with a threat and if the country wanted 
to produce its own defense capability. Another concern is the issue of being a more 
normalized country. This paper has focused on whether the people of Japan see military 
build-up, and to a further extent nuclear weapons, in conflict with Article 9 and the 
pacifist nature of the country. There now becomes the concept of a normalized military 
and what that means for Japan. As Japan is the only country to renounce its sovereign 
right of war this could be the other factor that pushes the country toward a nuclear option. 
In the last chapter, this thesis will discuss what is believed to be the option Japan will 
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 WILL JAPAN CHOOSE THIS OPTION? V.
 WILL JAPAN GO DOWN THIS PATH? A.
The ultimate question becomes will Japan go down the proliferation path? The 
short answer, “Not yet.” Japan has many reasons to pursue a nuclear option such as an 
external threat and the decreasing of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Japan has threats that 
seem plausible and seem to be worrying the country in the form of China and North 
Korea. According to the Japanese Defense White Paper, North Korea is “continuing 
development of Weapons of Mass Destruction, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons.” 
Also, the country has stated that it would use nuclear attacks against the U.S. and other 
countries.
103
 North Korea has publicly identified Japan as a threat, and it was believed 
that the country’s nuclear weapons program was set into play because of its security 
environment.
104
 Of all factors, this thesis would argue that North Korea’s actions would 
be a major item in determining if Japan would choose a nuclear option. China has 
increased activities in the South China Sea and Japan has been concerned about any 
future intensification that could occur. Also, the non-transparent buildup of Chinese 
forces is another concern for the country. China’s main priority is believed to be 
preventing an independent Taiwan and the country has been increasing its international 
presence.
105 
While North Korea could be considered the most irrational of the two, in the 
eyes of Japan, China is viewed as the “greater strategic challenge.”
106
 
The importance of the Japan-U.S. security alliance will play a major role in the 
future of Japan and whether or not the country will obtain nuclear weapons as Japan’s 
alliance with the U.S. is its most significant insurance against a nuclear threat. With each 
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case study presented one of the primary factors has been security. Under the Yoshida 
Doctrine, the country relied on this since World War II. As the security environment has 
changed, and the U.S. has made strides in not only decreasing its nuclear arsenal, but also 
in its military operations, Japan will seek to provide its own defense. Japan, although not 
completely out spoken about it, does show that it has concerns with the security provided 
by the U.S. When the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence comes into question, 
Japan questions its nuclear posture.
107 
 
Japan has reviewed the constitution when issues have come up, and in some cases 
the country has re-interpreted portions of old ideas of the peace clause of the constitution. 
In the case of the establishment of the SDF, Japan made a re-interpretation of Article 9, 
claiming that it allows for the use of force for self-defense purposes. For BMD, it was 
argued that Article 9 could allow for limited collective self-defense, even though the 
purpose of the BMD program is for the defense of Japan. 
One case highlighted the idea of Japan having a more normalized military and 
Japan’s increasing nationalism. Research has shown that younger generations are 
showing an increase in this movement.
108 
This movement could help right-wing 
politicians promote ideas of an independent military.
109
 As for Japan having a more 
“normal” military, the country continues to engage in peace keeping operations while 
acquiring capabilities to modernize its forces. Therefore, one would conclude that the 
shrinking U.S. nuclear umbrella would not be the only factor that would push Japan to 
pursue a nuclear option. It would take that particular issue on top of North Korea 
continuing to proliferate and China continuing to build its conventional forces to a point 
that Japan would feel it needs its own nuclear arsenal to defend itself. 
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 HOW WOULD JAPAN PURSUE THIS OPTION? B.
The country would have to either become a nuclear weapon state under the NPT 
or withdraw from the treaty. Under the NPT, Japan is not allowed to manufacture, 
receive, transfer, or control nuclear devices. Since Japan ratified the treaty the country 
has remained committed to nuclear arms reduction. Japan would have to amend, re-
interpret, or abolish Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Nothing shows that Japan has 
any intent of abolishing Article 9; therefore, it is very unlikely that it will happen. Japan 
has re-interpreted Article 9 in the past. At first the strict interpretation of Article 9 
maintained that Japan did not even allow for the Self Defense Force. As mentioned 
before, Prime Minister Yoshida believed that Article 9 did not allow the country to wage 
war in self-defense. The Japanese government would later interpret the constitution to 
mean the country did have the right to self-defense and was able to maintain “minimum” 
armed forces. The definition of minimum would be based on the international situation. 
The Cabinet Legislative Bureau, whose job is deciding if any legislation proposed 
contradicts existing laws, has maintained that nuclear weapons are prohibited under 
Article 9 for their offensive capability, but may allow a minimum in pursuit of the 
country’s right to self-defense. As Llewelyn Hughes has noted, a significant amount of 
work has argued that nuclear weapons can lead to military constraint and there is a 
possibility that policy may change in favor of developing nuclear weapons.
110
 The other 
option would be to interpret nuclear weapons to be for defensive purposes, as was the 
case with Japan obtaining a BMD capability. The Japan Defense Agency knew there 
would be constitutional constraints and would say that joint research was only for 
research and not development.
111
 The Japanese would insist that BMD was purely for 
defensive and did not pose a threat to its neighbors.
112
 Although, it would be hard to 
convince a country such as North Korea or China that the country is only trying to 
proliferate for defensive purposes. Domestic opinion would need to change. Many have 
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pointed out that those that were affected by the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki are decreasing over the years, but the nuclear allergy still exists in the minds of 
the people of Japan. Even with events such as China and North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
test, polls have shown that public opinion against nuclear weapons continues to grow.
113
 
As shown previously, the Norms versus Security debate has led Japan to change when 
security has become a concern, but to not always move too far to one side of the 
argument. Norms have said to rely on the U.S. for protection, and caused public opinion 
to see nuclear weapons as taboo. The security side has pushed for more robust military 
with an increasing external threat. The debate would continue with the nuclear option on 
the table. The security side of the debate may see Japan seeking a nuclear option, but the 
norms side will not allow those that want a nuclear Japan to reach that goal so easily. We 
may see small changes in policy that will establish nuclear weapons for defensive 
purposes only.  
 WHAT COULD BE SOME OF THE CONSEQUENCES? C.
Japan could become a stronger ally to the U.S. The U.S. has pushed for Japan to 
take a greater role in the defense of its country and supporting in the stabilizing of the 
East Asian region. Japanese intentions would be questioned in the international realm. 
The country has presented itself as a pacifist nation since the end of WWII. Another 
potential consequence of Japan pursuing a nuclear option is that an arms race may 
develop in the region. Christopher Hughes made the argument that Japan is in a “quiet” 
arms race with China.
114
 He pointed out that Japan has been trying to match the Chinese 
air power, blue-water navy, and counter its ballistic missiles. North Korea, who already 
sees Japan as a threat, may feel the need to intensify its proliferation of nuclear weapons 
if Japan were to do the same. However, a nuclear Japan could also have a stabilizing 
effect in the region, potentially like the U.S. and Russia in the cold war. Basically, the 
countries may obtain more nuclear weapons, but never use them. With the research from 
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this thesis I would argue that the more probable outcome would be that Japan choosing a 
nuclear option would lead to a nuclear arms race in the East Asian region, but no 
weapons would be fired as what happened in the Cold War. The scars from the nuclear 
attacks of WWII still linger in the country, China would not risk moving into a nuclear 
war with the U.S., and North Korea is still not likely to fire a weapon in the near future. 
 CONCLUSION D.
This thesis proposed that a decreasing nuclear arsenal and the changing security 
environment could be factors that play a major role in determining if Japan would pursue 
a nuclear option. However, based on the case studies presented it is still hard to determine 
if Japan will choose to go down this path. Security has been shown to be a key factor in 
determining what could lead Japan to pursue a more robust military. When Japan was 
deciding to form the SDF, the initial concerns were the issues on the Korean peninsula. 
Ballistic Missile Defense was another example where security was a concern, but also a 
concern of a decreasing deterrence provided by the U.S. The third case involving the 
decision to send the SDF to Iraq focused more on the idea of Japan having a “normal” 
military. Although, in each of the cases certain polices, such as Article 9 were re-
interpreted to allow for an increase in capabilities. One conclusion regarding the nuclear 
question is that Japan will always continue to debate this option when a crisis or 
significant event occurs, and the U.S. will play a major role in determining Japan’s 
future.  
In the view of the author, Japan would only pursue a nuclear option if the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella significantly reduced and if North Korea and China continued their 
trajectory with both their nuclear and conventional forces. Japan is already concerned 
with North Korea and China, but has relied on the continued support and reliability of the 
U.S. extended deterrence. The U.S. deterrence is weakening and becoming less reliable 
as it seems to not be affecting the actions of North Korea and China. The continued rise 
in military might of these two countries will create a greater threat to Japan. Based on 
what has been discovered with this research, security plays a factor in determining what 
 44 
the government of Japan will do, and an external threat is a factor that has pushed Japan 
to pursue a more robust military.  
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